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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3) (j ) , Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended) . The case has been assigned to the Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in setting 
aside the judgment entered against defendant Connie 
Schmittroth on February 8, 1999, pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(1) where said defendant took no action after the 
entry of final judgment until May 11, 1999, more than 
three months after the entry of final judgment. The 
trial court has no discretion to consider the merits of 
an untimely motion under Subdivision (b)(1). Richins v. 
Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 
1991) . With respect to an appeal which presents only 
questions of law, the trial court's rulings are accorded 
no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Mountain 
Fuel SUTDPIV V. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 
1988) . 
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II. Whether or not the trial court erred in setting 
aside the judgment entered against defendant Connie 
Schmittroth on February 8, 1999, pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(1) where said defendant failed to show good cause 
for her failure to earlier appear and defend the action 
and where plaintiffs were subjected to substantial 
prejudice thereby. The appellate court applies an abuse 
of discretion standard to review of the trial court's 
ruling on the merits of party's motion to set aside a 
default judgment or default certificate, and will reverse 
the trial court's decision only where it appears that 
there has been an abuse of discretion. Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 1984); Pacer Sport & 
Cvcle. Inc. v. Mvers. 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975). 
III. Whether or not the trial court erred in its 
interpretation of the metes and bounds legal description 
contained in a warranty deed. With respect to findings 
of fact, the Trial Court's findings will be upheld unless 
the evidence is so completely lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
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or unjust. Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1982) . 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann., section 57-1-12. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 26, 1998, Greg and Michele Heuser obtained 
a default certificate against Connie Schmittroth. [R:243] 
On the basis of Connie Schmittroth's default, Greg and 
Michele Heuser entered into settlement agreements with 
all other defendants. [R:375-378, 454-456, 476-477] On 
February 8, 1999, Greg and Michele Heuser obtained a 
default judgment against Connie Schmittroth. [R:450-453] 
On May 11, 1999, Connie Schmittroth sought, for the 
first time after the entry of final judgment, to have the 
default judgment set aside. [R:478-485] (The pleadings 
submitted by the respective sides that may have been 
considered by the Court could have included those 
pleadings appearing in the record at [R:379-511] Oral 
Argument heard on July 29, 1999 has been transcribed. 
[R:776]) On September 22, 1999, the Trial Court signed an 
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order setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(1). [R:533-534] 
On July 10, 2000, Greg and Michele Heuser filed a 
motion for summary judgment. [R:610-622] ( The pleadings 
filed in support and in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment appear in the record at [R:610-715]) 
The facts with respect to the warranty deed were 
undisputed. By a minute entry, dated October 2, 2001, 
the Trial Court denied the Heuser's motion for summary 
judgement on the basis of an analysis which involved an 
incorrect reading of the metes and bounds legal 
description. [R:716-718] In fact, the Trial Court made 
the error on its own motion, inasmuch as none of the 
parties have even so much as suggested that the legal 
description might be read as it was by the Trial Court. 
The Heusers then filed a motion for summary judgment 
to correct the error by the Trial Court. [R:719-732] 
(The pleadings filed in support and in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment appear in the 
record at [R:719-742]) A detailed analysis of the legal 
description, measurement by measurement, was provided by 
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the Heusers and uncontested by Connie Schmittroth. By a 
minute entry, dated January 17, 2001, the Trial Court 
denied the Heuser's motion. [R:743-744] 
Because it appeared futile to try the case, in light 
of the Trial Court's reading of the legal description, 
plaintiff's requested that the Trial Court issue a final 
order so that the case could be appealed. [R: 759-764] A 
final order was entered February 27, 2001. [R:765-766] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 17, 1992, Plaintiffs and Appellants Greg and 
Michele Heuser purchased a home from defendant and 
appellee Connie Schmittroth and her husband. Connie 
Schmittroth and her husband conveyed title to the subject 
property by means of a warranty deed (the "Warranty 
Deed"). The Warranty Deed contained a metes and bounds 
legal description of the subject property as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 
654.16 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96 
feet, South 38 degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89 
degrees 8 minutes West 375 feet from the Southeast 
corner of Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 
8 minutes West 149.42 fee; thence North 5 degrees 
East 325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of 
12400 South Street, running East and West; thence 
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Easterly along South line of street 124.04 feet; 
thence South 38 minutes West 325 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. 
consisting of 1.024 acres (the ''Subject Property"). 
[Complaint, paragraph 14; A true and correct copy of the 
Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "G".] [R:10] 
Defendants Lee and Carroll Holmstead, owners of the 
neighboring parcel and prior grantors in the chain of 
title, claimed that they were the owners of 4709 square 
feet (.108 acres) of the Subject Property (the "Disputed 
Area"), the location of which is identified as Parcel 2 
on the surveyor's map attached hereto as Exhibit XXH." 
[Complaint, paragraph 12; Exhibit "H"; Answer and 
Counterclaim of defendant Holmstead.] [R.-17-27] 
Defendant Lee Holmstead sought to quiet title to the 
Disputed Area pursuant to a counterclaim filed in this 
lawsuit. [Counterclaim of Lee Holmstead.] [R:17-27] 
Defendant Connie Schmittroth failed and refused to 
"warrant and defend the title" of Greg and Michele 
Heuser, as required by Utah Code Ann., section 57-1-12. 
[Answer of defendant Schmittroth.] [R:514-532] By 
virtue of the Warranty Deed, Connie Schmittroth (as well 
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as the other defendants in the chain of title) owed a 
duty to the Heusers to defend their title in the subject 
property as warranted and/or to compensate them for their 
damages. Each of the defendants failed and refused to do 
so. 
Plaintiffs Greg and Michele Heuser sustained general 
damages as to the lost value of the Disputed Area. 
Plaintiffs Greg and Michele Heuser sustained special 
damages consisting of: the costs of survey associated 
with defending title and attorney's fees incurred as 
special damages in defending title. [R:379-400, 450-453, 
775] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Default judgment was entered on February 8, 1999. 
The said judgment was the final order in the case. No 
action was taken by the Defendant for more than three 
months after the entry of default judgment. 
On May 11, 1999, the Defendant asked the Court to set 
aside the default judgment. The Trial Court did not have 
the jurisdiction pursuant: to Rule 60(b) to set aside the 
default judgment pursuant to an untimely motion under 
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Rule 60(b)(1). Moreover, it was an abuse of the Court's 
discretion to set aside the default judgment without a 
showing of good cause on the part of the Defendant and 
without considering the prejudice to the Plaintiff which 
resulted therefrom. 
Plaintiff subsequently moved for summary judgment in 
considering the motion for summary judgment, the Court 
errored in its reading of the legal description which 
applied to the case. The legal description contained a 
qualification "more or less" with respect to the length 
of the property. The Trial Court improperly applied the 
qualifier "more or less" to the width of the property. 
The qualification expressly did not apply to the width of 
the property. The Court used the qualifier to resolve a 
boundary question far beyond the scope of a "more or 
less" qualification. The boundary question at issue 
concerned a fence line and a very significant piece of 
land. The warranty deed contained no exception for the 
fence line in the habendum clause following the legal 
description. 
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The default judgment entered on February 8, 1999 
should be reinstated. Alternatively, summary judgment 
should be granted in favor of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
The evidence submitted in support of damages claimed by 
Plaintiffs and Appellants included surveys and appraisals 
and was undisputed by Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT MORE THAN NINETY DAYS 
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provides a 
time limit for filing a motion to set aside a default 
judgment. Rule 60(b) states, 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered to taken. 
In the present case, the Trial Court's order 
indicates that the default certificate and default 
judgment were set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). 
Defendant Schmittroth's motion purports to be a Rule 
60(b) motion. The default judgment was entered on 
February 8, 1999. Said judgment was the final order in 
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the case. Three months from said date was Monday, May 9, 
1999. Defendant took no action as to the default 
judgment until May 11, 1999. 
The time limit set by Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional. 
Once a defemlt judgment has been entered, it can only be 
set aside in accordance with subdivision (b). Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court has no discretion to consider the merits 
of an untimely motion under Rule 60(b)(1). Richins v. 
Delbert Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 
1991); Peck v. Cook, 29 Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT 
WITHOUT 
JUDGMENT 
A 
WITHOUT REGARD 
AND 
SHOWING OF 
TO THE 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
GOOD 
PREJUDICE 
CAUSE AND 
TO PLAINTIFFS. 
Even if defendant Schmittroth had timely filed a 
motion to set aside the default judgment or default 
certificate, she failed to show good cause for her 
failure to earlier file an answer or otherwise appear in 
the case. She knew she was being sued. She knew that 
she had been served. Yet, she intentionally made the 
decision not to appear. Correspondence predating the 
10 
default judgment proves her knowledge and her proactive 
decision not to earlier file an appearance. Failing to 
appear in a legal action has been disapproved by the Utah 
Supreme Court as an inappropriate strategy. The Courts 
have been clear that in order to qualify under subsection 
(1) , there must be some evidence of actual "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co. , 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah 1953) (Illness alone 
is an insufficient excuse to set aside default 
judgment.); Vallev Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 
(Utah 1983) (Mere inconvenience is an insufficient excuse 
for failing to appear at trial.); Bd. of Educ. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1963) (To 
set aside a default judgment, "the excuse must be 
reasonable to constitute excusable neglect" and a default 
will not be set aside where the defendant has chosen not 
to answer) . Because a good reason is required to set 
aside a default, default should not be set aside where 
the defendant has chosen not to answer. Bd. of Educ. of 
Granite School Dist. v. Cox, supra, 384 P.2d 806, 807. 
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The Courts have been clear that a default should not 
be set aside where it will result in prejudice to another 
party. Defendant had a chance to seek relief from 
default at a time when no prejudice would have resulted, 
but she chose not to do so. Instead, because of her 
conscious strategy in this case, she failed to take any 
action until too late. 
Setting aside an entry of default or default judgment 
is a tool of equity and, therefore, within the discretion 
of the Court. Discretion should be exercised carefully. 
Some showing of good cause must be made. Where prejudice 
will result, default should not be set aside. See 
Westinahouse El. SUPD. CO. V. Paul W. Larsen Co., Inc., 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) ("The courts generally tend 
to favor granting relief from default judgments where 
there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse 
party.") 
In the present case, Plaintiffs and the other 
defendants entered into settlement agreements with the 
understanding that a default had been in place for more 
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than a year and that plaintiffs would obtain a judgment 
against defendant Connie Schmittroth, as well. Trial had 
been set for January 14, 1999. Defendant Schmittroth had 
not appeared in response to the service of process upon 
her, despite a default certificate more than one year 
old, despite knowledge of the impending trial date, and 
despite an invitation extended to her to participate in 
mediation. It was a virtual certainty that she would not 
be able to have her default set aside. 
Plaintiffs were highly prejudiced when defendant 
Connie Schmittroth's default was set aside, because their 
position as to the other defendants had already 
significantly changed. Plaintiffs no longer were able to 
obtain a complete recovery without relitigating the case 
with defendant Schmittroth. Additionally, defendant 
Connie Schmittroth filed a purported a counterclaim 
against defendants Lee and Carroll Holmstead. 
In contrast, Defendant Schmittroth never did provide 
the Trial Court with any indication of good cause for her 
failure to earlier appear or participate in any way with 
the ongoing litigation. 
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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, 
Where the pleadings and affidavits disclose 
undisputed facts which permit the resolution of a 
controversy as a matter of law, the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment with respect to that matter. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Aired Ins. 
Aaencv v. Zions First Nat.Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
The pleadings and discovery responses of defendant 
Connie Schmittroth establish that she conveyed title to 
the Subject Property to plaintiffs Greg and Michele 
Heuser by the Warranty Deed. As a matter of law, she is 
under obligation to plaintiffs with respect to the 
property described, as provided by Utah Code Ann. , 
section 57-1-12. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 requires the grantor 
executing a warranty deed to convey the property 
described therein free and clear of other claims and to 
warranty that the property is the grantor's to convey. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 also requires the grantor 
to appear and defend the title to the property in the 
name of the grantee. The written contract between 
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defendant Connie Schmittroth and the plaintiffs contained 
the same requirements to convey ownership by warranty 
deed free of the above-described claims. 
Connie Schmittroth failed and refused to "warranty 
and defend title" pursuant to the warranty deed and as 
required by Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12. 
Section 57-1-12 provides: 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the 
following form: WARRANTY DEED [form provided]. Such 
deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, 
his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, 
together with all the appurtenances, rights and 
privileges thereunto belonging, with covenants from 
the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, 
that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he 
has good right to convey the same; that he guarantees 
the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet 
possession thereof; that the premises are free from 
all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and 
personal representatives will forever warrant and 
defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs 
and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. 
Any exceptions to such covenants may be inserted in 
such deed following the description of the land. 
By defendant Connie Schmittroth's failure to defend 
the title of Greg and Michele Heuser in the property 
described in the Warranty Deed, plaintiffs Greg and 
Michele Heuser were damaged. Greg and Michele Heuser 
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were deprived of title to part of the land described in 
the Warranty Deed, they were damaged in an amount equal 
to the value of the Disputed Area. The value of the 
Disputed Area was established by the uncontested real 
estate appraisal of David Van Drimmelen, MAI, dated 
October 29, 1998. 
In an action for breach of the warranty to defend 
title, the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees 
incurred as special damages in litigation with third 
parties concerning title. See Gillmor v. Cumminas, 904 
P.2d 703, 708-09 (Utah App. 1995); South Sanoitch Co. v. 
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah App. 1988). Under the 
third-party litigation rule, the costs and attorneys fees 
incurred by the Heusers in dealing with defendant Lee 
Holmstead and Kevin Fitzgerald are compensable as special 
damages. Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979). 
Special damages in this case consist of the costs of 
survey associated with defending title and attorney's fees 
incurred as special damages. 
In an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff may 
recover attorneys fees if provided by the contract. The 
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contract between Connie Schmittroth and plaintiffs was the 
standard Real Estate Purchase Contract which contains such 
an attorneys fee provision. Plaintiffs are also entitled 
to their costs. 
Summary Judgment should have been granted against 
defendant Connie Schmittroth as to her breach of warranty. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
METES AND BOUNDS LEGAL DESCRIPTION. 
The Warranty Deed speaks for itself. It contains a 
legal description, describing the legal boundaries of the 
property conveyed. 
In response to Plaintiff!s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Trial Court issued a minute entry dated 
October 2, 2000. The Trial Court erred in its reading of 
the legal description. 
With regard to the length of the property, the legal 
description states that the measurement of the length is 
325 feet, more or less, to the South boundary of 12400 
South Street, as well as 325 feet, more or less, from 
12400 South to the point of beginning. Therefore, 
according to the legal description, the length of the 
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property is approximately 325 feet. The Heusers would not 
be able to sue the Defendants if the distance from one end 
of the property to 12400 South Street was slightly less 
than 325 feet. However, this is not the boundary of the 
property which is in dispute. The width of the property 
is in dispute. With regard to the width, the Defendants 
did not qualify the metes and bounds measurements with the 
term "more or less." The width of the property is 
warranted without any exception. 
A copy of the surveyor's map, including the specific 
references to the property boundary measurements was 
provided to the Trial Court. The following detailed 
analysis of the surveyors depiction of the property 
measurements was also provided to the Trial Court. 
The legal description to the warranty deed is as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 
654.16 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96 
feet, South 38 degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89 
degrees 8 minutes West 375 feet from the Southeast 
corner of Section 30, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 8 
minutes West 149.42 feet; thence North 5 degrees East 
325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of 12400 
South Street, running East and West; thence Easterly 
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along South line of street 124.04 feet; thence South 
38 degrees West 325 feet, more or less, to the place 
of beginning. 
There are a total of nine points shown on the 
surveyor's map referenced in the legal description. The 
location of those points were numbered on the surveyor's 
map for convenience of reference for the Trial Court. The 
language describing the borders of the property was also 
highlighted on the surveyors map to allow the Trial Court 
to quickly identify the sides of the property being 
measured by each element of the legal description. 
The point numbered 1 on the surveyors map is the 
surveyors monument from which the location of the property 
is calculated. This is referred to in the legal 
description as the Southeast corner of Section 30, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. The first four measurements in the legal 
description take us from the monument to the Southeast 
corner of the property. 
Point 2 as marked on the surveyors map is a point 
North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 654.16 feet from point 1. 
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This measurement is the first phrase in the legal 
description. 
Point 3 is a point North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 
769.96 feet from point 2. This is the second clause 
contained in the legal description. 
Point 4 is a point South 38 minutes West 41.79 feet 
from point 3 . This is the third clause in the legal 
description. 
Point 5 is a point North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 375 
feet from point 4. This is the fourth clause in the legal 
description. The fifth clause is the reference to the 
monument. The fifth point is the Southeast corner of the 
property. 
The sixth point marked on the surveyors map is a point 
North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 149.42 feet from point 5. 
This is the first measurement of the width of the 
property. It does not contain any exception such as the 
language "more or less." Therefore, it must be concluded 
that the Defendants warranted to the Heusers that the 
distance from the corner of the property to 600 East 
Street was 149.42 feet, without exception. Incidentally, 
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the point of beginning is also warranted without 
exception. Since the fence line in dispute is on the East 
side of the property, rather than the West side of the 
property where 600 East Street is located, even if there 
was a reference to "more or less" on the legal description 
for the width of the property, it would only allow for 
variation in the location of 600 East Street and not for 
the East boundary line of the property. The only way that 
the Defendants could have stated an exception for the 
fence line was to actually mention the fence line in the 
habendum clause following the granting clause of the legal 
description. 1 This is also the only way that the 
Defendants could have avoided committing fraud against the 
Heusers in conveying the property to them. 
Point 7 is a point North 5 degrees East 325.5 feet, 
more or less, to the South line of 12400 South Street. 
The words "more or less" refers to the fact that the 
1The Trial Court was provided with a copy of the Black's 
Law Dictionary definition for the meaning of the term 
"More or Less". The term is only properly used for slight 
or unimportant inaccuracies. See further discussion of 
applicable case law below. 
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South boundary of 12400 South Street might be less than 
325.5 feet. Since the location of 12400 South Street is 
not an issue in this litigation, the reference to "more or 
less" is irrelevant to this litigation. 
Point 8 on the surveyors map is a point Easterly along 
the South line of 12400 South Street 124.04 feet. This is 
another measurement of the width of the property. This 
measurement takes the measurer to a point approximately 
14.6 feet past the fence in question. Again, there is no 
exception with regard to this measurement. The Defendants 
have warranted all of this property to the Heusers. They 
must defend the Heusers' title in this property without 
exception. 
The point marked 9 on the surveyors map is the same as 
the point marked 5 on the surveyors map. It is South 3 8 
minutes West 325 feet, more or less, to the point of 
beginning. Again, the words "more or less," do not create 
any exception as to the width of the property. They 
simply reflect the exception stated as to the other 
measurement of the length of the property. In other 
words, if the earlier measurement of the length property 
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required less than 325.5 feet to reach 12400 South, then 
the return measurement must also be adjusted accordingly 
to reach the specifically stated point of beginning. The 
point of beginning is not in question. Instead, only the 
distance from the point of beginning to point 8 is subject 
to the exception created by the words "more or less." 
On the surveyor's map the letters A and B were written 
to indicate the location of the plus and minus sign used 
by the surveyor to reference the "more or less" phrase 
used in the deed. 
The surveyor also wrote the word "parcel 2" with an 
arrow indicating the portion of the property between the 
fence line in question and the East boundary of the 
property. Parcel 2 is the property in dispute. From this 
depiction, the Trial Court should have been able to see 
that the problem created by the fence was a problem as to 
the width of the property, not the length of the property. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 permits a grantor to 
state any exceptions to the covenants of warranty 
following the description of the land. The exception 
permitted by Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12 should be 
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stated in the habendum clause which follows the granting 
clause of the legal description. See Dansie v. Hi Country 
Estates Homeowners, 987 P.2d 30 (Utah 1999). In Hancock 
v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990), cited by 
the Court, the deed actually referred to the fence line in 
the habendum clause, as permitted by Section 57-7-12. In 
the instant case, Defendants did not do so. 
As the Trial Court noted, none of the prior warranty 
deeds used by the Defendants to convey the property 
contained an exception using the words "more or less" to 
excuse themselves from liability relative to the location 
of 12400 South. When Ms. Schmittroth and her husband 
warranted the properties to the Heuser, the creator of 
their deed was clever enough to insert this language for 
the first time to limit their exposure to any claim based 
on the location of the street. 
Conversely, Defendants have never mentioned the fence 
line or mentioned any exception for the fence line or for 
any measurement of the property concerning its East and 
West width. The Defendants must be required to meet the 
obligations created by Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12. 
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They failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to 
state an exception for the fence or for the East and West 
measurements. Interestingly, their failure to make an 
exception as to the fence line has occurred in the very 
same deed in which they astutely added an exception 
covering the location of the street. Clearly, the 
Defendants did not intend to create an exception for the 
fence line. It must be the inescapable conclusion of this 
Court that the parties intended to warrant the East 
boundary of the property as stated in the legal 
description. 
The foregoing conclusions are substantiated by the 
testimony offered by the Heusers in this case. As the 
Trial Court noted in its minute entry, they have testified 
that the property boundary was the topic of discussion 
prior to the closing. If the Defendants had attempted to 
place an exception for the fence line in the warranty deed 
following that discussion, the Heusers would have refused 
to close on the sale of the property without a survey. 
This was a conscious decision that they made prior to 
their purchase of the property, based on the information 
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about legal descriptions which Mr. Penman had discussed 
with them when Mr. Penman purchased their former home. 
Since the Defendants chose to warranty the property 
without any exception for the fence line, there was not a 
need for a survey prior to closing. The Heusers followed 
the course of action which they intended at closing, which 
was to address the location of the fence with the neighbor 
after the closing. After failing to resolve the situation 
with the neighbor, the Heusers availed themselves of their 
rights under Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-12. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should issue an order requiring 
the Trial Court to reinstate the Default Judgment. 
Alternatively the Court of Appeals should order the Trial 
Court to grant Plaintiff's motion summary judgment and 
enter an award of damages consistent with the uncontested 
evidence submitted by Plaintiffs. 
DATED this JSL day of June, 2001. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Thor B. Roundy 
275 East South Temple, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Bar No. 6435 
I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this "7%' day of 
June, 2001, I served a copy of the attached BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANTS, Trial Court No. 960906139, Appellate Court No. 
20010250-CA, upon counsel for the appellee in this matter 
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
John L. McCoy 
10 West Broadway, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER and MICHELE 
HEUSER, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN 
FITZGERALD, CONNIE 
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD, 
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY 
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN 
HOLMSTEAD, individuals, 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Civil No. 960906139 
Judge William A. Thome 
The Default of defendant CONNIE SCHMITTROTH (AKA Connie 
Gardner) is hereby entered in the above-captioned matter. Said 
defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on 
October 24, 1997. Said defendant has failed to file an Answer 
thereto within the time reqoi-
DATED this ^Jfa day of,. 
/??r 
- • ' ? , - i
 ( . , :<2dSTRICT COURT CLERK 
c<%^ tf, // 
HP G0> 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435) 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
275 East South Temple, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
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Deputy Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER and MICHELE 
HEUSER, individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN 
FITZGERALD, CONNIE 
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD, 
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY 
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN 
HOLMSTEAD, individuals, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT CONNIE 
SCHMITTROTH 
Civil No. 960906139 
Judge William A. Thome 
OATC 
Based upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgement, and the 
evidence submitted in support thereof, and further based upon the 
Default Certificate executed by the Clerk of the Court on January 
26, 1998 and for good cause appearing therein, Default Judgment is 
hereby ORDERED as against Defendant Connie Schmittroth as follows: 
1. The Court finds that on June 17, 1992 Defendant Connie 
Schmittroth conveyed by Warranty Deed the following described 
property in Salt Lake County, Utah to plaintiffs: 
Beginning at a point North 10 degrees 37 minutes West 654.16 
feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 76.96 feet, South 38 
degrees West 41.79 feet and North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 
375 feet from the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 3 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 89 degrees 8 minutes West 149.42 fee; thence North 5 
degrees East 325.5 feet, more or less, to the South line of 
12400 South Street, running East and West; thence Easterly 
along South line of street 124.04 feet; thence South 38 
minutes West 325 feet, more or less, to the place of 
beginning. 
(the "Subject Property") 
2. The Court finds that the following described portion of 
the Subject Property was at the time occupied by the defendants 
Lee and Carroll Holmstead: 
Beginning at the fence corner which is located North 626.72 
feet and West 589.09 feet from the Southeast Corner of 
Section 30, Township 3 South/ Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, thence North 1 degree 03 minutes 07 seconds 
East 307.86 feet more or less to the South line of 12400 
South Street; thence East 14.16 feet along said South line; 
thence South 0 degrees 38 minutes 00 seconds West 308.53 feet 
more or less to an East-West fence line; thence North 87 
degrees 34 minutes 16 seconds West 16.41 feet along said 
Fence line to the point of beginning. Contains 4709 sq. ft. 
(the "Disputed Property.") 
3. The Court finds that Defendant Connie Schmittroth, 
breached the warranty to convey and the warranty to defend title 
and orders that Plaintiffs are entitled to general damages in the 
amount of $9,300.00 as the fair market value of the Disputed 
Property. 
Heuser/Default Jx 2 
4. The Court finds that Defendant Connie Schmittroth 
breached the warranty to defend said title and caused Plaintiff's 
to incur additional damages in litigation as to title and orders 
that Plaintiffs are entitled to special damages in the amounts of 
$600.00 for the costs of survey associated with defending title; 
and $12,110.00 with regard to attorney's fees incurred as special 
damages in defending title against third-party claims as of 
December 30, 1998. 
5. The Court orders Defendant Connie Schmittroth to pay 
costs incurred in this action in the amounts of $170.00 with 
regard to the filing of the case,$12.00 with regard to service of 
process upon Defendant Connie Schmittroth, and $63 0.45 as to 
depositions taken in the matter. 
6. Attorney's fees incurred in litigation as against 
Defendant Connie Schmittroth are awarded in the amount of $250.00 
as of December 30, 1998. 
7. Judgement is rendered herein in the total amount of 
$23,072.45, which may be augmented hereafter to reflect damages 
sustained after December 30, 1998. Post-judgment interest shall 
accrue on this judgment at the legal rate until paid. 
8. Plaintiff shall be entitled to the costs of collection, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, with regard to the 
collection of this judgment. 
Heuser/Default.Jx 3 
DATED this & day of ^ *? •-••--. 1999. 
BY THE COURT^ \ 
Third^ Di^ fc^ fit Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
CONNIE SCHMITTROTH, by United States mail, postage prepaid, this £1 
day of January, 1999, to the following: 
Connie Gardner(AKA Connie Schmittroth) 
2495 North 800 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 -^~~'''CsT^t -' -
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Third Judicial District 
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Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435) 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
275 East South Temple, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER and MICHELE 
HEUSER, individuals, : ORDER SETTING ASIDE 
DEFAULT 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : Civil No. 960906139 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN : Judge William A. Thorne 
FITZGERALD, CONNIE 
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD, : 
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY : 
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN : 
HOLMSTEAD, individuals, : 
Defendants. 
Based on the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b)(1), 
the default judgment against Connie Schmittroth entered February 
12, 1999 and the default certificate entered January 26, 1998 are 
hereby set aside. 
The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the default 
judgment on February 8, 1999, the Court was unaware that 
Plaintiff's motion for default judgment was opposed by Defendant 
Connie Schmittroth. 
FILED 
DISFrilCTCOUR? 
99 AUG 27 
ijii.-.u v. x -••- -"•> Truer 
SALJT«KE CGUNTY 
'MAGEO 
BY. 
IEPUTY CLE?K 
Dated this <y ^ day of^August, 1999 
Third Di^ rlfc'i-'XIourt - .">_' 
„ ^ 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Setting Aside Default, by 
United States mail, postage prepaid, this ^fH^> day of August, 
1999, to the following: 
John L. McCoy 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1314 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 960906139 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: 10/02/2000 
Clerk: debbiep 
The Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment" has come before this 
court pursuant to Rule 4-501. This matter involves a boundary 
dispute. The Plaintiff's purchased the subject property via a 
warranty deed from Defendants Kevin Fitzgerald and Connie 
Schmittroth. Prior to the purchase, the Plaintiff's asked Kevin, 
Connie's ex-husband, if the fence was the proper boundary line. 
According to the Plaintiff's testimony, "he said no, its somewhere, 
and waived his hand back and forth in here." (Greg Heuser's 
deposition). A year after the sale, the Plaintiffs hired a 
surveyor and learned that the fence was encroaching on 0.108 acres 
of their property. Since the Plaintiffs were unable to reach an 
agreement with their neighbors, this action pursued. The 
Plaintiffs argue that the metes and bounds description in the 
warranty deed is controlling and therefore that they own the 
disputed parcel. In this motion, the Plaintiff's argue that the 
Defendant, Connie Schmittroth, has failed to warrant and defend 
their title pursuant to U.C. A. 57-1-12. Therefore, they claim she 
is liable for breach of warranty and damages. However, the latter 
statute provides that "any exceptions to such covenants may be 
briefly inserted in such deed following the description of the 
land." Here Connie (and Kevin) did exactly what the statute 
authorizes. She made an exception to her covenants for quiet 
possession and freedom from encumbrances when following the metes 
and bounds description she inserted the exception "more or less." 
None of the prior warranty deeds used by the Defendants to convey 
the property contained this language. Here, the fence was erected 
prior to Kevin and Connie's ownership of the property. Since Kevin 
was unsure of the location of legal boundary line, he notified the 
Plaintiffs of the possibility of an encumbrance. Then Kevin and 
Connie inserted the "more or less" provision into the warranty 
deed. The warranty deed passes all the right, title and interest 
Case No: 960906139 
Date: Oct 02, 2000 
the grantor has in the property. Therefore, the Plaintiffs did 
receive a conveyance in fee simple. However, the "more or less" 
language in the warranty deed insulates the grantors, Connie and 
Kevin, from liability under U.C.A. 57-1-12. See Hancock v. Planned 
Development Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185-186 (Utah 1990). Therefore 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This Minute 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 960906139 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail 
Mail 
Dated this 3 day of M± 
JOHN L. MCCOY 
ATTORNEY DEF 
10 West Broadway 
Suite 310 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
THOR B ROUNDY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
275 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 150 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841020000 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, 
Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 960906139 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: 01/17/2001 
Clerk: rayd 
The Plaintiff's Motion to Correct the Decision in Minute Entry and 
for Summary Judgment has come before the Court pursuant to Rule 
4-501. The Court, having considered Plaintiff's motion and after 
having reviewed the memoranda in support and in opposition thereof, 
hereby DENIES Petitioner's Motion. This Minute Entry shall 
constitute the final order of the Court on the. matters presented 
herein. 
Case No: 960906139 
Date: Jan 17, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 960906139 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
3 9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84111-2705 
Mail RONALD E. KUNZ 
ATTORNEY DEF 
8701 SOUTH 1300 WEST 
WEST JORDAN UT 84088 
Mail JOHN L. MCCOY 
ATTORNEY DEF 
10 West Broadway 
Suite 310 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail THOR B ROUNDY 
ATTORNEY DEF 
275 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 150 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841020000 
Dated this day of 
Deputy Court /.Clerk 
S^r-^ 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 643 5) 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
275 East South Temple, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREG HEUSER and MICHELE 
HEUSER, individuals, : ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No. 960906139 
v. 
: Judge Dever 
LEE HOLMSTEAD, KEVIN : 
FITZGERALD, CONNIE : 
SCHMITTROTH, AFTON HOLMSTEAD, : 
CARROLL HOLMSTEAD, ROY : 
HOLMSTEAD, and KATHLEEN : 
HOLMSTEAD, individuals, 
Defendants. : 
Based on the Motion for Order of Final Dismissal, dated 
January 29, 2 0 01, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED 
as follows: 
1. On October 2, 2000, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which opinion suggests that Plaintiffs will 
not prevail in any trial in the above-captioned action. 
2. Based on the motion dated January 29, 2001, it appearing 
that the parties wish to take no further action in this matter, 
subject only to the Plaintiffs' right of appeal. 
3. Therefore, good cause appearing, the Motion for Order of 
Final Dismissal is hereby granted, and the remaining claims in the 
Third JUL!"!*,! District 
above-captioned action are hereby dismissed. 
DATED this day of February, 2001. 
Certificate of Service 
rt Judge 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, by United States mail, 
postage prepaid, this ff^ day of February, 2001, to the 
following: 
John L. McCoy 
10 West Broadway, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Mail tax notice t o . GRANTEE . A,Mr»«. 2 4 9 5 North 8 5 0 Went, PROVO, UTAH 
of 
CONVEY 
WARRANTY DEED 
E . J . WlrMER and DEBRA WIMMER, husband and w i f e 
PROVO , County of UTAH 
and WARRANT to 
84604 
grantor 
.State of Utah, hereby 
ERIC W. GARDNER 
of 
grantee 
KWVO' UTAH for the sum of 
TEW DOLLARS AM) OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS 00K*NI8?c 
the following described tract of land in 
Stilte of Utah: 
UTAH Count>. 
All of Lot 3, Plat "B-, WOOD HOLLOW ESTATES SUBDIVISION, 
Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah. 
Subject to Easements and Restrictions of record. 
The Grantee herein agrees to assume and pay the existing balance 
of a certain Trust Deed executed by E. J. WTMMER and DEBRA WIMMER, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, Trustor, in favor of PROVO ABSTRACT COMPANY, INC. 
Trustee, and FAR WEST BANK, Beneficiary, in the principal amount of 
82,053.00, Dated 10/12/1989, Recorded 10/17/1989, as Entry No. 
31317, in Book 2636, at Page 45, of Official Records. FAR WEST 
BANK hereby appoints ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Successor Trustee and hereby assigns to ZIONS MORTGAGE COMPANY,The 
Foregoing Trust Deed, said assignment Dated 10/23/1889, Recorded 
1/30/1990, as Entry No. 2923, in Book 2661, at Page 762, of Official 
Records. 
WITNESS, the hands of said grantors , thU 
NOVEMBER , A. D. 1990 
8th day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of UTAH 
NOVEMBER 
. A. D. 19 9 ° On the 8 c h day of 
personally appeared before me 
E. J . WINNER and DEBRA WIMMBR, husband and w i f e 
the aignera of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t h e y executed the 
^X £anr7^ui Notary Publk. 
My commiation expires & - 2 0 - 9 1 .Residing in_ PROVO, UTAH 
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57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the 
following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (in-
sert place of residence), hereby conveys and war-
rants to (insert name), grantee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of dol-
lars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this 
day of , 19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, 
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with cove-
nants from the grantor, his heirs and personal repre-
sentatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; 
that he has good right to convey the same; that he 
guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the 
quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free 
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his 
heirs and personal representatives will forever war-
rant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his 
heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatso-
ever. Any exceptions to such covenants may be 
57-1-13 
briefly inserted in such deed following the description 
of the land. 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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